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You surely saw that all over Instagram already but I just had to play my part. At the exact moment this post went up, on the eleventh hour of the eleventh day of the eleventh month of the year, a full century ago the Armistice was signed, ending WW1. Whether you agree with wars or not, hate soldiers or love them, you can only respect them. No matter if the reasons were right or wrong, it doesn't change the value of their sacrifice. You can politicize wars but not a soldier's action. And if today militaries are receiving a lot of backlash, I doubt our youth (of which I'm part) would be remotely as capable of doing what our grandfathers did. Preserving history is not only preserving a heritage, it's also preserving and keeping the memory alive of those who built it. You can argue all you want during the year about the righteousness of wars, but today just take a time to remember, and don't sully, the names of those who fought for an idea they believed in.
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Also, big shout out to @ultimateshotuk who created those brillant compositions and allowed me to use them today.
You surely saw that all over Instagram already but I just had to play my part. At the exact moment this post went up, on the eleventh hour of the eleventh day of the eleventh month of the year, a full century ago the Armistice was signed, ending WW1. Whether you agree with wars or not, hate soldiers or love them, you can only respect them. No matter if the reasons were right or wrong, it doesn't change the value of their sacrifice. You can politicize wars but not a soldier's action. And if today militaries are receiving a lot of backlash, I doubt our youth (of which I'm part) would be remotely as capable of doing what our grandfathers did. Preserving history is not only preserving a heritage, it's also preserving and keeping the memory alive of those who built it. You can argue all you want during the year about the righteousness of wars, but today just take a time to remember, and don't sully, the names of those who fought for an idea they believed in. - Also, big shout out to @ultimateshotuk who created those brillant compositions and allowed me to use them today.
Luftwaffe Ultimate Fighters: Advanced Last Resort - Heinkel P.1078C [Part.8]
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It is not exactly clear when Heinkel started working on the P.1078, but in December 1944, three versions were submitted to the RLM tender for a new jet fighter. The P.1078A was very similar to the Blohm & Voss P.212 in design (see Part.7). The second version, the P.1078B, was entirely different. It was also a tailless short fuselage fighter, the forward part being, however formed of two pods (see second picture). The left one accommodated the cockpit while the left one held the forward landing gear and the armament, composed of two MK 108 30mm cannons. If the B variant was superior to the A, the RLM rejected it. The rectangular air intake, set deep back in the fuselage, between the pods, was deemed inappropriate for general operations and the fact the pilot's view to the right was obstructed by the other pod, led to its cancellation.
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But it was the third variant, the P.1078C, which also bore some resemblance with the P.212.03, which was selected by the RLM. It was a flying-wing, tailless fighter, with a 40° swept wing. Like the two other variants, it had a flatter rectangular air intake and duct to allow space for the cockpit and front wheel. 1'450 liters of fuel could be carried in the wings which also had marked anhedral on the wingtips, replacing the rudder and horizontal stabilizer. Heinkel believed this particular wing model would have less influence at critical Mach numbers than vertical fins. The RLM believed the C variant would outperform the A in terms of altitude and speed, as it also was 150kg lighter. No prototypes were built.
#LuftwaffeFighters
#Wunderwaffenww2
Luftwaffe Ultimate Fighters: Advanced Last Resort - Heinkel P.1078C [Part.8] --- It is not exactly clear when Heinkel started working on the P.1078, but in December 1944, three versions were submitted to the RLM tender for a new jet fighter. The P.1078A was very similar to the Blohm & Voss P.212 in design (see Part.7). The second version, the P.1078B, was entirely different. It was also a tailless short fuselage fighter, the forward part being, however formed of two pods (see second picture). The left one accommodated the cockpit while the left one held the forward landing gear and the armament, composed of two MK 108 30mm cannons. If the B variant was superior to the A, the RLM rejected it. The rectangular air intake, set deep back in the fuselage, between the pods, was deemed inappropriate for general operations and the fact the pilot's view to the right was obstructed by the other pod, led to its cancellation. - But it was the third variant, the P.1078C, which also bore some resemblance with the P.212.03, which was selected by the RLM. It was a flying-wing, tailless fighter, with a 40° swept wing. Like the two other variants, it had a flatter rectangular air intake and duct to allow space for the cockpit and front wheel. 1'450 liters of fuel could be carried in the wings which also had marked anhedral on the wingtips, replacing the rudder and horizontal stabilizer. Heinkel believed this particular wing model would have less influence at critical Mach numbers than vertical fins. The RLM believed the C variant would outperform the A in terms of altitude and speed, as it also was 150kg lighter. No prototypes were built. #LuftwaffeFighters  #Wunderwaffenww2 
Luftwaffe Ultimate Fighters: Advanced Last Resort - B&V P.212.03 [Part.7]
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In 1943, Blohm & Voss started working on a series of five swept-wing tailless fighters. When the requirements for the "emergency" fighter arrived in late 1944, B&V submitted the result of these preliminary works: the P.212. It featured a deep, stubby-fuselage with a dramatic 40° swept-back wing with a pronounced dihedral. The aircraft had a bubble canopy over a pressurized cockpit and was to be powered by the HeS 011. The wings were to be built with stressed steel but wood and aluminium could be used as well. Because of the short fuselage, most of the fuel was stored in the wings which could accommodate 800 liters of fuel unprotected and 150 litres protected. A 400 liters fuel tank was built in the fuselage between the cockpit and the engine, totaling 1'350 liters of fuel (check the requirements in the first post of the series). The fighter was to be armed with two MK 108 30mm cannons fed by 100 rounds each but provision existed to fit a third one.
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The air intake was in the nose and the duct ran through the fuselage to the engine, featuring a slight curvature to allow space for the cockpit. This could have altered the airflow and reduce the HeS 011's output. On 9 January 1944, the RLM refused the P.212.02 (a modified P.212) and ordered B&V to give the aircraft some form of vertical rudder. This resulted in the P.212.03, the final version of Blohm & Voss' design. The wing was redesigned and the aircraft could now carry 2'100 liters of fuel in the airframe plus 300 liters internally, which would have gave it an impressive 4h endurance. A battery of 22 R4Ms could also have been fitted under the wings. Satisfied with the design, the RLM ordered three prototypes on 23 February 1945. B&V prepared for wind tunnel-testings and work on the V1 prototype was expected to be completed in mid-August. However, all work ended in mid-April due to no forthcoming contracts.
#LuftwaffeFighters
#Wunderwaffenww2
Luftwaffe Ultimate Fighters: Advanced Last Resort - B&V P.212.03 [Part.7] --- In 1943, Blohm & Voss started working on a series of five swept-wing tailless fighters. When the requirements for the "emergency" fighter arrived in late 1944, B&V submitted the result of these preliminary works: the P.212. It featured a deep, stubby-fuselage with a dramatic 40° swept-back wing with a pronounced dihedral. The aircraft had a bubble canopy over a pressurized cockpit and was to be powered by the HeS 011. The wings were to be built with stressed steel but wood and aluminium could be used as well. Because of the short fuselage, most of the fuel was stored in the wings which could accommodate 800 liters of fuel unprotected and 150 litres protected. A 400 liters fuel tank was built in the fuselage between the cockpit and the engine, totaling 1'350 liters of fuel (check the requirements in the first post of the series). The fighter was to be armed with two MK 108 30mm cannons fed by 100 rounds each but provision existed to fit a third one. - The air intake was in the nose and the duct ran through the fuselage to the engine, featuring a slight curvature to allow space for the cockpit. This could have altered the airflow and reduce the HeS 011's output. On 9 January 1944, the RLM refused the P.212.02 (a modified P.212) and ordered B&V to give the aircraft some form of vertical rudder. This resulted in the P.212.03, the final version of Blohm & Voss' design. The wing was redesigned and the aircraft could now carry 2'100 liters of fuel in the airframe plus 300 liters internally, which would have gave it an impressive 4h endurance. A battery of 22 R4Ms could also have been fitted under the wings. Satisfied with the design, the RLM ordered three prototypes on 23 February 1945. B&V prepared for wind tunnel-testings and work on the V1 prototype was expected to be completed in mid-August. However, all work ended in mid-April due to no forthcoming contracts. #LuftwaffeFighters  #Wunderwaffenww2 
Luftwaffe Ultimate Fighters: Advanced Last Resort - Armament III [Part.6]
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Another air-to-air missile was supposed to arm the second generation of German jet fighters, although this particular weapon was only intended for the Ta 183 and the Me P.1101. The Ruhrstahl X4 rocket was a wire-guided, fin-stabilized weapon designed to be launched by fighters from outside the range of the bombers' guns. Development started in June 1943 and, in December 1944, it became a priority. The missile was carrying a 20kg warhead which was triggered by a proximity fuze. Initially built for the Fw 190 and the Me 262, the X-4 quickly became one of the most important weapon of the "emergency" fighter program. It was to be fired from a range of 1.5-2.5km before being guided by the pilot who followed it visually. Powered by a BMW 548 rocket motor, the X-4 could fly towards its target at 250m/s during 30 seconds. Stabilisation in flight was achieved by four swept wings attached to the fuselage of the weapon.
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Two of the opposed wings were fitted with the wire-housing, each containing a spool wound with approximately 6km of steel wire. The two other wings were fitted with tracer candles to help the pilot follow and guide the missile toward its target. If, after 28 seconds the missile failed to find a target, it would self-destruct. The first air-launched test of the X-4 occurred in September 1944 and was considered partially successful, although some remained very hesitant about its operational deployment. In fact, the missile's fuel system was highly volatile and the pilot had to remain in level flight and focus on the X-4, making him very vulnerable to escort fighters. The combat effectiveness of the missile was thus doubted and development ended in February 1945, although air tests continued with a Ju 88 and a Me 262. Weighing 60kg, the missile was mounted on a ETC 70 launch rack (originally used for SC70 bombs). While carrying two missiles, the Me 262 was 260kg heavier and 30km/h slower.
#LuftwaffeFighters
#Wunderwaffenww2
Luftwaffe Ultimate Fighters: Advanced Last Resort - Armament III [Part.6] --- Another air-to-air missile was supposed to arm the second generation of German jet fighters, although this particular weapon was only intended for the Ta 183 and the Me P.1101. The Ruhrstahl X4 rocket was a wire-guided, fin-stabilized weapon designed to be launched by fighters from outside the range of the bombers' guns. Development started in June 1943 and, in December 1944, it became a priority. The missile was carrying a 20kg warhead which was triggered by a proximity fuze. Initially built for the Fw 190 and the Me 262, the X-4 quickly became one of the most important weapon of the "emergency" fighter program. It was to be fired from a range of 1.5-2.5km before being guided by the pilot who followed it visually. Powered by a BMW 548 rocket motor, the X-4 could fly towards its target at 250m/s during 30 seconds. Stabilisation in flight was achieved by four swept wings attached to the fuselage of the weapon. - Two of the opposed wings were fitted with the wire-housing, each containing a spool wound with approximately 6km of steel wire. The two other wings were fitted with tracer candles to help the pilot follow and guide the missile toward its target. If, after 28 seconds the missile failed to find a target, it would self-destruct. The first air-launched test of the X-4 occurred in September 1944 and was considered partially successful, although some remained very hesitant about its operational deployment. In fact, the missile's fuel system was highly volatile and the pilot had to remain in level flight and focus on the X-4, making him very vulnerable to escort fighters. The combat effectiveness of the missile was thus doubted and development ended in February 1945, although air tests continued with a Ju 88 and a Me 262. Weighing 60kg, the missile was mounted on a ETC 70 launch rack (originally used for SC70 bombs). While carrying two missiles, the Me 262 was 260kg heavier and 30km/h slower. #LuftwaffeFighters  #Wunderwaffenww2 
Luftwaffe Ultimate Fighters: Advanced Last Resort - Armament II [Part.5]
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For most of 1944, German engineers recognized that air-to-air rockets would be needed as the range of fixed armaments could hardly be improved. Furthermore, the defensive power of Allied bombers was becoming increasingly more effective, making close-range attacks more challenging. Experience with the W.Gr.21 showed that rockets were effective only when fired in batteries by a group of fighters. The targeted bombers could thus hardly avoid the masse of rockets which would also have an important psychological impact. Even if no bombers were hit, aerial rockets were good for breaking formations of bombers, isolating them and making them easy preys for fighters. In June 1944, requirements for a new aerial rocket was put forward by the Luftwaffe and asked for an electrically-fired, fin-stabilized rocket packing enough explosives to destroy a four-engined aircraft with a single hit. A consortium of companies came up with a 814mm long and 55mm diameter rocket containing 520g of explosive and weighting 3,5kg. Firing trials of what was designated R4M (or "Rakete 4kg Minenkopf") started at the end of October 1944. The rocket was unsatisfactory however and the design was refined until January 1945 when its final form was deemed good enough.
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The R4M, also known as Orkan ("Hurricane") was intended to launch from the Me 262 from wooden underwing racks weighting 21kg. Known as the EG.-R4M, each rack could carry 12 rockets which were released by volleys of 3. The Me 262 was thus armed with 24 R4Ms for a total additional weight of 126kg which made it only 16km/h slower. The rocket was first deployed in March 1945 and saw moderate success due to its poor accuracy. Nevertheless, it successfully brought some bombers down but was, in the end, better at breaking formations, like the W.Gr.21, neutralizing the bombers' defensive power and making them vulnerable to close-range attacks by individual fighters.
#LuftwaffeFighters
#Wunderwaffenww2
Luftwaffe Ultimate Fighters: Advanced Last Resort - Armament II [Part.5] --- For most of 1944, German engineers recognized that air-to-air rockets would be needed as the range of fixed armaments could hardly be improved. Furthermore, the defensive power of Allied bombers was becoming increasingly more effective, making close-range attacks more challenging. Experience with the W.Gr.21 showed that rockets were effective only when fired in batteries by a group of fighters. The targeted bombers could thus hardly avoid the masse of rockets which would also have an important psychological impact. Even if no bombers were hit, aerial rockets were good for breaking formations of bombers, isolating them and making them easy preys for fighters. In June 1944, requirements for a new aerial rocket was put forward by the Luftwaffe and asked for an electrically-fired, fin-stabilized rocket packing enough explosives to destroy a four-engined aircraft with a single hit. A consortium of companies came up with a 814mm long and 55mm diameter rocket containing 520g of explosive and weighting 3,5kg. Firing trials of what was designated R4M (or "Rakete 4kg Minenkopf") started at the end of October 1944. The rocket was unsatisfactory however and the design was refined until January 1945 when its final form was deemed good enough. - The R4M, also known as Orkan ("Hurricane") was intended to launch from the Me 262 from wooden underwing racks weighting 21kg. Known as the EG.-R4M, each rack could carry 12 rockets which were released by volleys of 3. The Me 262 was thus armed with 24 R4Ms for a total additional weight of 126kg which made it only 16km/h slower. The rocket was first deployed in March 1945 and saw moderate success due to its poor accuracy. Nevertheless, it successfully brought some bombers down but was, in the end, better at breaking formations, like the W.Gr.21, neutralizing the bombers' defensive power and making them vulnerable to close-range attacks by individual fighters. #LuftwaffeFighters  #Wunderwaffenww2 
Luftwaffe Ultimate Fighters: Advanced Last Resort - Armament I [Part.4]
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The original requirements for the second generation of German fighter jet asked for four MK 108 30mm cannons. However, at a meeting between the RLM and the manufacturers on 8-10 September 1944, Blohm & Voss, Focke-Wulf, Heinkel and Messerschmitt unanimously proposed to reduce the armament to two MK 108. The MK 108 was an excellent weapon; light, reliable, easy to build and tremendously powerful. This was done at the expense of ballistic performances which forced the aircraft to attack at close-quarter. However, the weapon was very appreciated at half the weight of the MK 103 (30mm as well) but thrice the power! It quickly earned a fearsome reputation and was nicknamed the "pneumatic hammer". The cannon could fire two different shells: the high-explosive self-destroying tracer and the incendiary self-destroying shell. After various tests, the Luftwaffe had concluded that maximum destruction of an enemy aircraft could be created by causing the largest possible explosive effect in its interior. This meant the shells had to pack the biggest amount of explosives with the thinner shell wall possible (the thicker the wall, the more energy it needed to break). This resulted in the 'Minengeschoss' (or 'Mine Shell'), a 30mm round with 85g of RDX explosives and a thin shell wall. Tests showed that only three shells could destroy a large bomber, and a single one could wreck a fighter.
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Incendiary shells were also considered as extremely potent ammunitions but they were only really effective when targeted at fuel tanks. A special degree of penetrative force was thus needed for the shell to reach the fuel tanks carried deep inside the airframe. Incendiary rounds received a hydrodynamic fuze that activated only when making contact with fluid. It was calculated that, from the rear, fuel tanks were occupying only one tenth of a bomber's surface area. Between five and ten incendiary rounds were thus needed to cause inextinguishable fires.
[Continuing in comments⬇️]
Luftwaffe Ultimate Fighters: Advanced Last Resort - Armament I [Part.4] --- The original requirements for the second generation of German fighter jet asked for four MK 108 30mm cannons. However, at a meeting between the RLM and the manufacturers on 8-10 September 1944, Blohm & Voss, Focke-Wulf, Heinkel and Messerschmitt unanimously proposed to reduce the armament to two MK 108. The MK 108 was an excellent weapon; light, reliable, easy to build and tremendously powerful. This was done at the expense of ballistic performances which forced the aircraft to attack at close-quarter. However, the weapon was very appreciated at half the weight of the MK 103 (30mm as well) but thrice the power! It quickly earned a fearsome reputation and was nicknamed the "pneumatic hammer". The cannon could fire two different shells: the high-explosive self-destroying tracer and the incendiary self-destroying shell. After various tests, the Luftwaffe had concluded that maximum destruction of an enemy aircraft could be created by causing the largest possible explosive effect in its interior. This meant the shells had to pack the biggest amount of explosives with the thinner shell wall possible (the thicker the wall, the more energy it needed to break). This resulted in the 'Minengeschoss' (or 'Mine Shell'), a 30mm round with 85g of RDX explosives and a thin shell wall. Tests showed that only three shells could destroy a large bomber, and a single one could wreck a fighter. - Incendiary shells were also considered as extremely potent ammunitions but they were only really effective when targeted at fuel tanks. A special degree of penetrative force was thus needed for the shell to reach the fuel tanks carried deep inside the airframe. Incendiary rounds received a hydrodynamic fuze that activated only when making contact with fluid. It was calculated that, from the rear, fuel tanks were occupying only one tenth of a bomber's surface area. Between five and ten incendiary rounds were thus needed to cause inextinguishable fires. [Continuing in comments⬇️]
Luftwaffe Ultimate Fighters: Advanced Last Resort - Aerodynamics [Part.3]
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Only advanced aerodynamics could allow the designs to meet the high requirements. One key element to this chapter is German manufacturers' access to the revolutionary works and discoveries of German aerodynamicists during the 1930s. The biggest of them obviously being the swept wing and its advantages above Mach 0,8. In fact, when approaching the speed of sound, swept wings are delaying the compressibility effect and avoid the creation of turbulences and shockwaves along the wings. Complicate words that could be summarized very simply: less drag, more speed. In September 1940, Messerschmitt published its studies of different swept wings models in wind tunnels which prompted other manufacturers to develop designs featuring this new type of wing. However, the Germans were very reticent over the design as engines couldn't take aircraft to speeds at which the swept wings were very interesting. From mid-1943, this situation improved as numerous jet engines were made available or were in development. Manufacturers started working on swept wings again and Messerschmitt led the way as little data was available in the high Mach numbers. Quite logically, all designs submitted for the replacement of the Me 262 featured swept wings.
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The second major issue was the emplacement of the engine within the airframe. Even if it was obvious that fitting the engine inside the fuselage was the best solution from a drag standpoint, it posed a major problem. Indeed, a longer air duct was increasing the loss of thrust. But the exhaust opening also had to be as close as possible to the tail to avoid further loss of thrust. The less risky compromise was to put the exhaust nozzle at the rear and try to make the air duct as short as possible. Messerschmitt used a Me 262 to measure thrust loss in relation of the length of the air duct and concluded that a 3m duct was reducing thrust by 135kgf, or 10% of the HeS 011's expected output. All six manufacturers dealt with this issue differently but the general consensus was to fit the engine in the shortest fuselage possible, a feature shared by all six designs.⬇️⬇️⬇️
Luftwaffe Ultimate Fighters: Advanced Last Resort - Aerodynamics [Part.3] --- Only advanced aerodynamics could allow the designs to meet the high requirements. One key element to this chapter is German manufacturers' access to the revolutionary works and discoveries of German aerodynamicists during the 1930s. The biggest of them obviously being the swept wing and its advantages above Mach 0,8. In fact, when approaching the speed of sound, swept wings are delaying the compressibility effect and avoid the creation of turbulences and shockwaves along the wings. Complicate words that could be summarized very simply: less drag, more speed. In September 1940, Messerschmitt published its studies of different swept wings models in wind tunnels which prompted other manufacturers to develop designs featuring this new type of wing. However, the Germans were very reticent over the design as engines couldn't take aircraft to speeds at which the swept wings were very interesting. From mid-1943, this situation improved as numerous jet engines were made available or were in development. Manufacturers started working on swept wings again and Messerschmitt led the way as little data was available in the high Mach numbers. Quite logically, all designs submitted for the replacement of the Me 262 featured swept wings. - The second major issue was the emplacement of the engine within the airframe. Even if it was obvious that fitting the engine inside the fuselage was the best solution from a drag standpoint, it posed a major problem. Indeed, a longer air duct was increasing the loss of thrust. But the exhaust opening also had to be as close as possible to the tail to avoid further loss of thrust. The less risky compromise was to put the exhaust nozzle at the rear and try to make the air duct as short as possible. Messerschmitt used a Me 262 to measure thrust loss in relation of the length of the air duct and concluded that a 3m duct was reducing thrust by 135kgf, or 10% of the HeS 011's expected output. All six manufacturers dealt with this issue differently but the general consensus was to fit the engine in the shortest fuselage possible, a feature shared by all six designs.⬇️⬇️⬇️
Luftwaffe Ultimate Fighters: Advanced Last Resort - Engine [Part.2]
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Before discussing the different designs, let's focus on their common denominators. Starting here with the engine.
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The Jumo 004 never fully satisfied the Luftwaffe as it was heavy and not powerful enough. Producing 900kgf of thrust, it wasn't good enough to power a single-engine fighter. The Germans thus sought a Class-II jet engine rated between 1'000-2'000kgf (the Jumo 004 being a Class-I, under 1'000kgf). Heinkel started working on such an engine in late 1942 but problems soon arose. Becoming the HeS 011, it had an unusual compressor/turbine consisting of a diagonal compressor formed by a three-stage axial compressor and a single-stage centrifugal compressor, completed by a two-stage turbine. A circular combustion chamber incorporated duplex fuel injectors, making the engine better suited for high-altitude operations over the single-nozzle fuel injectors found on Allied jet engines and the Jumo 004. The diagonal compressor was the main issue as it was unreliable and excessively complicate to build, failing after just one hour on the first prototype on the test bench. The HeS 011 also had, like the Jumo 004, an adjustable jet nozzle controlled by a "bullet". The development required considerable work and Heinkel was ordered to focus entirely on the HeS 011 as the Luftwaffe was convinced the design had tremendous potential.
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By the end of 1943, five prototypes had been built and in early 1944, work commenced on a second series of prototypes suitable for flight tests. Machining problems and dispersion of the facilities caused by Allied bombings further delayed the development of the engine. It's only in late 1944 that the HeS 011 became sufficiently mature to be run at the expected 1'300kgf thrust, becoming the most powerful engine in Germany (at the same time the Rolls-Royce B.41 had developed a 2'200kgf thrust). Three basic production models were proposed and expected to go into production by the end of 1945.
[Continuing in comments⬇️]
Luftwaffe Ultimate Fighters: Advanced Last Resort - Engine [Part.2] --- Before discussing the different designs, let's focus on their common denominators. Starting here with the engine. - The Jumo 004 never fully satisfied the Luftwaffe as it was heavy and not powerful enough. Producing 900kgf of thrust, it wasn't good enough to power a single-engine fighter. The Germans thus sought a Class-II jet engine rated between 1'000-2'000kgf (the Jumo 004 being a Class-I, under 1'000kgf). Heinkel started working on such an engine in late 1942 but problems soon arose. Becoming the HeS 011, it had an unusual compressor/turbine consisting of a diagonal compressor formed by a three-stage axial compressor and a single-stage centrifugal compressor, completed by a two-stage turbine. A circular combustion chamber incorporated duplex fuel injectors, making the engine better suited for high-altitude operations over the single-nozzle fuel injectors found on Allied jet engines and the Jumo 004. The diagonal compressor was the main issue as it was unreliable and excessively complicate to build, failing after just one hour on the first prototype on the test bench. The HeS 011 also had, like the Jumo 004, an adjustable jet nozzle controlled by a "bullet". The development required considerable work and Heinkel was ordered to focus entirely on the HeS 011 as the Luftwaffe was convinced the design had tremendous potential. - By the end of 1943, five prototypes had been built and in early 1944, work commenced on a second series of prototypes suitable for flight tests. Machining problems and dispersion of the facilities caused by Allied bombings further delayed the development of the engine. It's only in late 1944 that the HeS 011 became sufficiently mature to be run at the expected 1'300kgf thrust, becoming the most powerful engine in Germany (at the same time the Rolls-Royce B.41 had developed a 2'200kgf thrust). Three basic production models were proposed and expected to go into production by the end of 1945. [Continuing in comments⬇️]
Luftwaffe Ultimate Fighters: Advanced Last Resort - Introduction [Part.1]
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Throughout 1943 and 1944, the RLM ("Reichsluftfahrtministerium", Ministry of Aviation) put all its faith in the Me 262 and the Jumo 004 jet engine. However, when the world's first jet fighter entered service in August 1944, many shortcomings were evident. The Jumo 004 was unreliable and the Me 262 was heavy, needed two engines and was costly to produce. German intelligence had revealed the existence of the Gloster Meteor and the Bell P-59 Airacomet and, even if both types lagged behind the Me 262, they showed that the Allies were also into jet technology. Despite their technological superiority, the Germans feared how quickly the Allies could improve their designs. In fact, it was paramount for the Luftwaffe to develop more advanced aircraft as it was its only solution to challenge Allied air superiority.
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In autumn 1944, Oberstleutnant Siegfried Knemeyer, Head of the Technical Development of the RLM, initiated a tender competition amongst all major aircraft manufacturers to replace and best the Me 262. Knemeyer wanted a high-performance fighter/interceptor capable of taking on future Allied jets and B-29s the Germans were expecting to see in their skies very soon. The tender for this "emergency fighter" was sent to Blohm & Voss, Focke-Wulf, Heinkel, Henschel, Junkers and Messerschmitt (Focke-Wulf and Messerschmitt were already working on such a project since late 1943). The requirements were: a pressurized and armored cockpit (armor capable of withstanding 12,7mm rounds from the front and 20mm rounds from the back), an ejection seat, self-sealing and fire-protected fuel tanks, enough fuel for one hour of full-power flight (later changed to 1'200 liters of fuel), the HeS 011 engine with possible additional boost rockets, four MK 108 30mm cannons (later reduced to two), full radio equipment and an auto-pilot, the EZ 42 gunsight, landing aid in poor weather, an airspeed of around 1'000km/h (621mph) and a 14'000m (46'000ft) service ceiling. Furthermore, a total load of up to 500kg of bombs was required.
#LuftwaffeFighters
#Wunderwaffenww2
Luftwaffe Ultimate Fighters: Advanced Last Resort - Introduction [Part.1] --- Throughout 1943 and 1944, the RLM ("Reichsluftfahrtministerium", Ministry of Aviation) put all its faith in the Me 262 and the Jumo 004 jet engine. However, when the world's first jet fighter entered service in August 1944, many shortcomings were evident. The Jumo 004 was unreliable and the Me 262 was heavy, needed two engines and was costly to produce. German intelligence had revealed the existence of the Gloster Meteor and the Bell P-59 Airacomet and, even if both types lagged behind the Me 262, they showed that the Allies were also into jet technology. Despite their technological superiority, the Germans feared how quickly the Allies could improve their designs. In fact, it was paramount for the Luftwaffe to develop more advanced aircraft as it was its only solution to challenge Allied air superiority. - In autumn 1944, Oberstleutnant Siegfried Knemeyer, Head of the Technical Development of the RLM, initiated a tender competition amongst all major aircraft manufacturers to replace and best the Me 262. Knemeyer wanted a high-performance fighter/interceptor capable of taking on future Allied jets and B-29s the Germans were expecting to see in their skies very soon. The tender for this "emergency fighter" was sent to Blohm & Voss, Focke-Wulf, Heinkel, Henschel, Junkers and Messerschmitt (Focke-Wulf and Messerschmitt were already working on such a project since late 1943). The requirements were: a pressurized and armored cockpit (armor capable of withstanding 12,7mm rounds from the front and 20mm rounds from the back), an ejection seat, self-sealing and fire-protected fuel tanks, enough fuel for one hour of full-power flight (later changed to 1'200 liters of fuel), the HeS 011 engine with possible additional boost rockets, four MK 108 30mm cannons (later reduced to two), full radio equipment and an auto-pilot, the EZ 42 gunsight, landing aid in poor weather, an airspeed of around 1'000km/h (621mph) and a 14'000m (46'000ft) service ceiling. Furthermore, a total load of up to 500kg of bombs was required. #LuftwaffeFighters  #Wunderwaffenww2 
The Reich's Air Industry [Part.3]
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It is Adolf Hitler himself who took the decisive decision which changed the organization of the German air industry fundamentally. By appointing Albert Speer as the head of the Ministry of Armament, the RLM would see the reforms it sought for two years. Strong of the personal support of the Führer, Speer was able to re-organise his Ministry and, more importantly, overrule the prerogatives of the Wehrmacht, gaining control over the entire German industrial base. Speer's main focus was to cut the direct link between the Wehrmacht's different branchs' staffs and the industries. Staffs were often putting orders directly under the impulse of technically imcompetent high-ranking officers, without the expertise of specialists.
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Jealousy and whims, instead of combat needs, were leading to impossible contracts that the industry simply couldn't fulfill. The link between the military and the industry was so direct that contract awards often depended on the personal relationship between the two concerned executants. In consequence, a competent and renowned manufacturer could be awarded a program while all its means were already monopolized by another. This rigid structure remained unchanged until 1943 when Speer came in to power and softened it.
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From this point on, only the technical bureau of the Ministry of Armament, the Technisches Amt, took the functions of the technical services of all branches of the Wehrmacht. Officers lost their influence and the study commission of the Ministry was now only formed by civilians. This restored the Minister of Armament's control over the industry which supplanted the Wehrmacht's direct authority. The Industrierat of 1941 remained in place and was further improved.
[More in Part.4]
#ReichAirIndustry
The Reich's Air Industry [Part.3] ––– It is Adolf Hitler himself who took the decisive decision which changed the organization of the German air industry fundamentally. By appointing Albert Speer as the head of the Ministry of Armament, the RLM would see the reforms it sought for two years. Strong of the personal support of the Führer, Speer was able to re-organise his Ministry and, more importantly, overrule the prerogatives of the Wehrmacht, gaining control over the entire German industrial base. Speer's main focus was to cut the direct link between the Wehrmacht's different branchs' staffs and the industries. Staffs were often putting orders directly under the impulse of technically imcompetent high-ranking officers, without the expertise of specialists. - Jealousy and whims, instead of combat needs, were leading to impossible contracts that the industry simply couldn't fulfill. The link between the military and the industry was so direct that contract awards often depended on the personal relationship between the two concerned executants. In consequence, a competent and renowned manufacturer could be awarded a program while all its means were already monopolized by another. This rigid structure remained unchanged until 1943 when Speer came in to power and softened it. - From this point on, only the technical bureau of the Ministry of Armament, the Technisches Amt, took the functions of the technical services of all branches of the Wehrmacht. Officers lost their influence and the study commission of the Ministry was now only formed by civilians. This restored the Minister of Armament's control over the industry which supplanted the Wehrmacht's direct authority. The Industrierat of 1941 remained in place and was further improved. [More in Part.4] #ReichAirIndustry 
The Reich’s Air Industry [Part.2]
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To answer to the augmentation of contract orders, the manufacturers decided to organise themselves via the Industrierat. An aircraft comprised three sub-units: the engine, the airframe and equipments. Three groups were created with the manufacturers involved in the fabrication of these three sub-units. Within each group, the representatives of each manufacturers were deciding together to split orders according to their own production capacities in order to make the best use of their industrial potential. As effective this new organisation can sound, the reform was a failure. Because practically, the RLM was still imposing its decisions to the industry while manufacturers had to organise everything by themselves.
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The organisational structure was still too rigid for reforms to work. Because all three branches of the Wehrmacht were in control of their respective part of the industry, the Ministry of Armament had no authority on them. This meant that every time raw materials or more workforce was attributed to the RLM, it immediately came in concurrence with the industrial parts working with the Kriegsmarine, the Heer, and the Ministry of Armament. If the reform slightly improved the system within the RLM, it didn’t accelerate production as the general structure of the German industry as a whole was unchanged.
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This eventually led to the suicide of Generalluftzeugmeister Ernst Udet, then in command of the development wing of the RLM. Udet had been in an untenable position as Göring and Hitler’s requirements were simply incompatible with Germany’s production capacity. He was replaced by Erhard Milch who, in turn, could only witness how unadapted the structure of industrial production was for a war of attrition. In fact, as long as the decisional power in terms of armament was split, all reforms were ineffective and production stagnated. However, Hitler took a decisive decision which improved everything drastically: appoint Albert Speer as the new minister of armaments.
[More in Part.3]
#ReichAirIndustry
The Reich’s Air Industry [Part.2] ——— To answer to the augmentation of contract orders, the manufacturers decided to organise themselves via the Industrierat. An aircraft comprised three sub-units: the engine, the airframe and equipments. Three groups were created with the manufacturers involved in the fabrication of these three sub-units. Within each group, the representatives of each manufacturers were deciding together to split orders according to their own production capacities in order to make the best use of their industrial potential. As effective this new organisation can sound, the reform was a failure. Because practically, the RLM was still imposing its decisions to the industry while manufacturers had to organise everything by themselves. - The organisational structure was still too rigid for reforms to work. Because all three branches of the Wehrmacht were in control of their respective part of the industry, the Ministry of Armament had no authority on them. This meant that every time raw materials or more workforce was attributed to the RLM, it immediately came in concurrence with the industrial parts working with the Kriegsmarine, the Heer, and the Ministry of Armament. If the reform slightly improved the system within the RLM, it didn’t accelerate production as the general structure of the German industry as a whole was unchanged. - This eventually led to the suicide of Generalluftzeugmeister Ernst Udet, then in command of the development wing of the RLM. Udet had been in an untenable position as Göring and Hitler’s requirements were simply incompatible with Germany’s production capacity. He was replaced by Erhard Milch who, in turn, could only witness how unadapted the structure of industrial production was for a war of attrition. In fact, as long as the decisional power in terms of armament was split, all reforms were ineffective and production stagnated. However, Hitler took a decisive decision which improved everything drastically: appoint Albert Speer as the new minister of armaments. [More in Part.3] #ReichAirIndustry 
The Reich’s Air Industry [Part.1]
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15’556 aircraft, all types included, produced in 1942. 25’527 in 1943, 39’807 in 1944. These three numbers illustrate rather well the formidable effort made by the German air industry which managed to nearly double the number of aircraft produced in a year despite the heavy Allied bombardments. So how the Germans pulled this out? This new series will try to bring an answer.
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In 1943, a number of setbacks started to modify the balance of power against the Germans. The defeats in the east, the increasing losses of U-boats as well as the arrival en masse of American aircraft forced the Reich to rethink its strategy. Not only Luftwaffe aircraft started to be in numerical inferiority, but they were also being outclassed by their Allied equivalents. The dissimilarity in quantity and quality became more and more obvious. “It soon became clear that the Allies could have more aircraft, fly faster and longer over the Reich than the Luftwaffe itself.” - Hauptmann Wilhelm Johnen
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As early as 1941, the decision-making structures of the German air industry started to evolve. Heavy and complex, it was a peacetime organisation which proved inadequate for a war of attrition. Conscious of these issues, the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (German High Command) gave orders to increase armament productions. Fritz Todt, Minister of Armament at the time, tried to improve the situation with various reforms, but these remained fairly ineffective. Todt’s reforms were limited by his own authority: they were only applied to civilian industries because defence factories producing weapons were under direct control of the Wehrmacht. This huge structural flaw led the Reichluftfahrtministerium (RLM, the Reich’s Air Ministry) to imitate a reform similar to Todt’s. This resulted in the Industrierat, a commission charged to improve the coordination between the RLM and the air industry. It regrouped representatives of all major manufacturers to coordinate the demands of the RLM and the industrial imperatives.
[More in Part.2]
#ReichAirIndustry
The Reich’s Air Industry [Part.1] ——— 15’556 aircraft, all types included, produced in 1942. 25’527 in 1943, 39’807 in 1944. These three numbers illustrate rather well the formidable effort made by the German air industry which managed to nearly double the number of aircraft produced in a year despite the heavy Allied bombardments. So how the Germans pulled this out? This new series will try to bring an answer. - In 1943, a number of setbacks started to modify the balance of power against the Germans. The defeats in the east, the increasing losses of U-boats as well as the arrival en masse of American aircraft forced the Reich to rethink its strategy. Not only Luftwaffe aircraft started to be in numerical inferiority, but they were also being outclassed by their Allied equivalents. The dissimilarity in quantity and quality became more and more obvious. “It soon became clear that the Allies could have more aircraft, fly faster and longer over the Reich than the Luftwaffe itself.” - Hauptmann Wilhelm Johnen - As early as 1941, the decision-making structures of the German air industry started to evolve. Heavy and complex, it was a peacetime organisation which proved inadequate for a war of attrition. Conscious of these issues, the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (German High Command) gave orders to increase armament productions. Fritz Todt, Minister of Armament at the time, tried to improve the situation with various reforms, but these remained fairly ineffective. Todt’s reforms were limited by his own authority: they were only applied to civilian industries because defence factories producing weapons were under direct control of the Wehrmacht. This huge structural flaw led the Reichluftfahrtministerium (RLM, the Reich’s Air Ministry) to imitate a reform similar to Todt’s. This resulted in the Industrierat, a commission charged to improve the coordination between the RLM and the air industry. It regrouped representatives of all major manufacturers to coordinate the demands of the RLM and the industrial imperatives. [More in Part.2] #ReichAirIndustry